(*)Director, Program on Population East-West Center, 1601 East-West Road,
Honolulu, Hawaii 96848-1601 USA
Email: MasonK@hawaii.edu. Tel: +(808) 944-7466 Fax: +(808) 944-7490
The goal of the current analysis (which is still in progress) is to understand whether there are consistent differences between Muslim and other women across a variety of Asian settings with regard to (a) women's autonomy and power and (b) their reproductive goals and behaviors. Also of concern is whether differences in women's autonomy between Muslims and other women can explain any differences in their fertility goals and behavior. The analysis uses data from a five-country collaborative project that collected survey interview data from married women aged 15-39 residing in approximately 60 communities in Pakistan (Punjab state), India (Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu), Malaysia (Port Klang, Pelau Island, Carey Island, Khota Bharu and surround Kelantanese kampongs), Thailand (national probability sample of communities), and the Philippines (2 communities in four rural areas, including Zamboanga, plus 2 Metro Manila neighborhoods). In all countries except Pakistan, data were collected for both Muslim and non-Muslim women. Interviews were conducted in 1993-94. Women were asked more than 15 questions about their participation in important household decisions (economic and fertility), whether they were free to visit particular types of places without obtaining permission from the husband or another senior family member, and the extent to which the husband used force or intimidation to control the wife's behavior.
The analysis first examines differences in the measures of women's autonomy between Muslim women and women of other religions. With the exception of Hindu women in Malaysia, the non-Muslim women consistently report greater freedom of movement than do the Muslim women. In India, however, this difference exists only in Tamil Nadu. In Uttar Pradesh, both Muslim and Hindu women report equally low levels of freedom of movement, a pattern that reflects the universal practice of purdah in this part of India. With regard to economic and fertility decision-making, consistent Muslim-other differences do not exist. In some settings, Muslim women have less say in decisions than other women have, but in others, they have as much or more say. With regard to exposure to being beaten by the husband, Muslim women are consistently less likely to be beaten than are their non-Muslim compatriots.
We used multivariate regression-type analysis (logit regression for dichotomous dependent variables and OLS regression for a 5-point scale of freedom of movement) to explore the extent to which differences between Muslim women and their non-Muslim countrywoman can be explained by differences in household socioeconomic status, women's age at marriage (as represented by their current age) and education, their ownership of land and experience with paid employment, and their position in the household vis-a-vis the head (wife versus another position) and kin relationship with the husband (any versus none). In no case were any of these variables able to explain the entire Muslim-non-Muslim differences in autonomy observed, although in a few settings, differences between Muslim and other women in their participation in paid employment was related to the differences in freedom of movement. (Whether the freedom of movement is the effect or the cause of paid employment is unclear, however.) Thus, the mechanisms through which Muslim women experience lesser freedom of movement and greater freedom from domestic violence go beyond differences in the schooling of girls, the provision of economic opportunities to women, or the nature of kinship in relation to the husband. We speculate that Islamic traditions about modesty, the subordination of wives to their husbands, and the husband's obligation to protect and cherish the wife may indeed play a role in creating these consistent differences in female autonomy across specific sociocultural settings.
With regard to reproductive goals and behavior, striking differences between Muslim and other women exist in virtually all settings examined in the project. The proportion of non-pregnant women who want no more children is greater among non-Muslim women than among their Muslim compatriots. Moreover, among the non-pregnant women who say they want no more children, non-Muslims are more likely than Muslims to be using contraception. Thus, the Muslim women in our samples behavior in a far more pronatalist manner than do their non-Muslim counterparts. In multivariate analysis that we are only able to illustrate briefly in this presentation, we have found that differences in freedom of movement and exposure to being beaten by the husband cannot explain differences between Muslim and other women in their reproductive goals and use of contraception. Thus, the greater pronatalism of Muslim women does not reflect their lower levels of freedom of movement, nor their greater protection from domestic violence. What produces these consistent differences thus remains unclear, although it may reflect the identification of local religious leaders with the pan-Islamic movement and its pronatalist undertones.